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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ized act may be ratified and that the ratification supplies
the authority which was lacking at the time the act was
done. Whether the President of the United States may be
regarded as an agent of Congress to the extent that an act
such as his Proclamation may be ratified at a later date is
a problem which will not be here discussed. We know
that the regulation of our currency is a Federal problem and
that. where the entire financial structure of the country is in
jeopardy, Congress would have authority under the Consti-
tution to regulate the banks both Federal and state.
3
Legislative authority for the President's Proclamation
has been based upon the "Trading with the Enemy Act"
of October 6, 1917, which, though passed as a war meas-
ure, gave the President sufficient authority to allow him to
close banks. The law was not repealed, and the act of the
President might well be justified thereunder. Even in the
absence of such legislative authority the proposition has
been advanced that the Proclamation might be sustained as
an exercise of an inherent right in the Chief Executive to
exercise extraordinary powers in periods of national crisis.'
C. M. Strouss.
THE PURCHASE MONEY TRUST ACT OF 1901 IN
THE LIGHT OF THE RECORDING ACTS
The Act in question provides that purchase money
trusts shall be void against bona fide creditors, and mort-
gagees and purchasers of or from the holder of the legal
title unless such takers had notice of the trust.'
8Federal Constitution, Article 1, Section 8. McCulloch v. Mary.
land. (Supreme Court of the United States, 1819. 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L,
ed. 579).
40 Stat. L. 411.
5Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 345, 346; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S.
135.
'Section 1 of The Act of 1901. P. L. 425; 21 Purd. Stat. Sec. 601
provides: "Whenever hereafter a resulting trust shall arise with respect
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It has been decided under this Act; (1) that the only
creditors protected are judgment creditors,2 (2) that their
protection does not depend upon their having advanced
credit on the faith of the debtor's interest in the land," (3)
that possession of the land by the beneficiary does not con-
stitute notice of his interest,' (4) that an action of common
law ejectment by the beneficiary alone satisfies the eject-
ment proviso.'
As so construed the Act has been used as a device for:
(I) extending the protection of the recording acts to judg-
ment creditors, (2) avoiding the doctrine of notice from
possession, and (3) avoiding the doctrine of is pendens.
In view of this operation of the Act and the important
amendment in 1931 in the recording acts,0 it is timely to
to real property, by reason of the payment of the purchase money by
one person, and the taking or making of the legal title In the name of
another, if the person advancing the purchase money has capacity to
contract, such resulting trusts shall be void and of none effect as to bona
fide judgment or other creditors, or mortgagees of the legal title,-or pur-
chasers from such holder without notice unless either, (1) a declaration
of trust in writing has been executed and acknowledged by the holder
of the legal title, and recorded in the recorder's office in the county
where the land is situated, or (2) unless an action of ejectment has
been begun in the proper county, by the person advancing the purchase
money. against the holder of the legal title."
2Burns v. Coyne, 294 Pa. 512, (1928); Central National Bank and
Trust Co. v. Kuntz, 161 Atl. 602 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1932).
SCentral National Bank and Trust Co. v. Kuntz, Supra., note 2.
'Rochester Trust Co. v. White, 243 Pa. 469, (1914); Levy v.
Hershberger, 249 Pa. 504, (1915); First National Bank of Mt. Union
v. Batch, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 494, (1929.); Dukes v. Raspa, 16 Del. Co.
275 (1923).
5Knecht v. Reichard, 22 Dist. Rep. 913 (1913).
6The Act of June 12, 1931, P. L. 558, amending The Act of May 12.
1925, P. L. 613, (the parts added in 1931 being in italic.): "That all
deeds, conveyances, contracts, and other instruments of writing wherein
it shall be the intention of the parties executing the same to grant.
bargain, sell, or convey any lands, tenements, or hcredttaments situate
in this Commonwealth, upon being acknowledged by the parties execut-
ing the same or proved In the manner provided by the laws of this
Commonwealth, shall be recorded In the office for the recording of deeds
in the county where such lands, tenements or hereditaniefits are situate.
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examine the Act of 1901 in the light of the recording
statutes7 to ascertain to what extent they furnish alternate
remedies, supplement each other, or contravene each other.
It had been long recognized that judgment creditors
were not within the protection of the recording acts, and
that they could bind only what a debtor actually had.8
Every such deed, conveyance, contract, or other instrument of writing
which shall not be acknowledged or proved and recorded as aforesaid,
shall be adjudged fraudulent and void as to any subsequent bona fide
purchaser or mortgagee or the holder of any judgment duly entered in the
prothonotary's office in the county where the lands, tenements, or heredit-
aments are situate, without actual or constructive notice unless such deed,
conveyance, contract, or other instrument of writing shall be recorded, as
aforesaid, before the recording of the deed or conveyance or the entry of
the judgment under which such subsequent purchaser, mortgagee, or
judgment creditor shall claim. Nothing in this act shall be construed to
repeal or modify any law providing for the lien of purchase money
mortgages.
7The principal general recording act and the one under considera-
tion here is the Act of May 19, 1893, P. L. 108, which provides: "All
deeds and conveyances, which shall be made and executed within this
Commonwealth of or concerning any lands, tenements, or hereditaments
in this Commonwealth, or whereby the title to the same may in any
way be affected in law or in equity, shall be acknowledged . . . (or
proved) . . . , and shall be recorded . . . in the county where such
lands . . . are lying and being, within ninety days after the execution
of such deeds or conveyance, and every deed or conveyance, which
shall not be proved or recorded as aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraud-
ulent and void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a
valid consideration, or any other creditor of the grantor or bargainor in
said deed or conveyance". This act amends the Act of March 18, 1775,
1 Sm. L. 422, but the only change made is a decrease in the time of re-
cording from six months to ninety days.
No consideration is here taken of the Act of April 24, 1931, P. L.
48, which provides that the legal effect of recorded instruments shall be
to give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers mortgagees and/or
judgment creditors of the grantors of such instruments. It is submitted
that that always was their effect.
SLudwig v. Highley, 5 Pa. 132, 138, (1847), and Reed's Appeal, 13
Pa. 476 (1850), in both of which cases judgment creditors were denied
relief against purchase money trusts. See also, Shryock v. Waggoner,
28 Pa. 430, (1857); Kauffman v. Kauffman, 266 Pa. 270, (1920); Ru-
binsky v. Kosh. 296 Pa. 285, (1929); and Ohio-Pennsylvania Joint-
Stock Land Bank of Cleveland v. Miller, 162 At1. 328, (Pa. Super, Ct.,
1932).
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The legislature, recognizing this defect, has extended to
judgment creditors the protection already afforded to pur-
chasers and mortgagees. Whether the limitations which
have been placed upon this protection by judicial construc-
tion will be applied to judgment creditors, is not altogether
free from doubt. The recording acts which had been the
subject of construction were ignored by the Act of 1925.
Apparently all that act does is to remove the period of time
in which instruments must be recorded. Although that
could have been done by a simple amendment of the Act
of 1893. the fact remains that the legislature wrote a new
law, changing the language of the old, and without ex-
pressly repealing or amending it. If the legislature had any
other intention, it will remain for the courts to find it, as it
is not apparent. 9  Since there appears no intention to
change the elements which have been held to constitute
notice or to constitute a purchaser one for value, we must
assume, until the contrary is decided, that they are still
necessary. The amendment of 1931 will, therefore, carry
the same rules over to the benefit of judgment creditors.
Assuming then that the Act of 1931 protects judgment
creditors as purchasers and mortgagees were protected
under prior acts, it appears that that act and the Act of
1901, in so far as the latter has been used as a device to
afford recording protection to judgment creditors, afford
concurrent remedies. It is clear that the Act of 1901 gives
such relief.10 Purchasers and mortgagees from secret trus-
DApparently the Supreme Court had an opportunity to pass on this
statute in the case of Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131 (1931). In that
case both the deeds concerned were executed subsequently to the effec-
tive date of the Act of 1925. The issue of what a recorded deed gives
notice was directly before the court, and the recording acts considered
at some length. Despite this opportunity to pass on the Act of 1925,
the court did not mention it, but decided the case under the Act of 1893.
This case merely confuses our inquiry by evidencing that the Act of
1893 is still in effect.
lOSupra., note 2.
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tees have always taken free from the beneficiary's interest,11
including cases of purchase money trusts. 12 This explains
why judgment creditors have been, almost without excep-
tion, the only persons who have invoked the Act of 1901.
It follows that judgment creditors, having been made pur-
chasers, need no longer rely on this special statute, although
it still furnishes them protection.
This conclusion may well be doubted in one respect. It
was early decided under the recording acts that if A owed
money to B, later deeding or mortgaging a property to him
as security, B was not a purchaser for value and thus was
not protected against prior unrecorded instruments.'3 The
policy seems to be that there must be some value parted
with on the strength of the conveyance. 14  Will a judgment
creditor have to show that he advanced credit on the faith
of the debtor's interest? To be logically consistent such a
requirement might be made under the Act of 1931. Such
a result is, however, very unlikely. The nature of judg-
ments differs sufficiently from that of deeds or mortgages to
warrant a refusal to extend the principle. No such require-
ment has been found in any other state, while several laws
similar to ours have been held to protect a creditor without
lPeebles v. Reading, 8 S. F9 R. 484, 495, (1822); Bracken v. Miller,
4 W: & S. 102, 113. (1842); Dickinson v. Byer. 87 Pa. 274. 281, (1878);
Bigley v. Jones, 114 Pa. 510, (1886); Dewalters v. Kuhnle, 199 Pa. 439,
(1901).
12Ludwig v. Highley, and Reed's Appeal, Supra., note 8; Fillman
v. Divers, 31 Pa. 274, (1858); Rupp's Appeal, 100 Pa. 531, (1882);
Lance v. Gorman, 136 Pa. 200, (1890). where it was held that although
a judgment creditor would not prevail over a purchase money trust, a
purchaser at the execution on that judgment would prevail.
13-A creditor who takes a mortgage, note, or other chose in action
only as security for a pre-existing debt, and not for money advanced at
the time, is not a purchaser for value", Ashton's Appeal, 73 Pa. 153,
162. In Adamson v. Souder, 205 Pa. 498 (1903), an unrecorded pur-
chase money trust prevailed over a conveyance given by the trustee to
secure a pre-existing debt.
'"He must have parted with some value or some right upon the
faith of the mortgage and at the time of it, to entitle him to protection
as a purchaser", 5 Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 4036, (1924),
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
reliance.15 The language of the Superior Court in con-
struing the Act of 1901 would seem to eliminate such a re-
quirement if applied by analogy to the Act of 1931.10 Since
under the Act of 1901 protection does not depend upon ad-
vancing credit in reliance,'1 this act either supplements the
Act of 1931 or acts concurrently with it according as the
latter is construed in this respect by the courts.
In addition to these instances where the acts work con-
currently, the Act of 1931 supplements the Act of 1901 in
two important aspects. First, in proceeding under the Act
of 1901 it was necessary to distinguish between resulting
and constructive trusts. 8 Thus it came about that if A
furnished the money for a conveyance to B, A's equity
would not prevail over a judgment creditor," but if B
wrongfully took the money from A and made the purchase,
then A's equity would prevail over a creditor of B.20 This
distinction need no longer be made, because, as stated," the
general recording acts protect against both types of equities.
The second addition made by the Act of 1931 is illustrated
by the case of Beman Thomas Co. u. White.22  In that case
15Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Fox, 265 Fed. 444, (D. C. 1920).
In Sylvanus v. Pruett, 9 Pac. (2d), 142, 144, (N. M., 1932) it was
stated; "The rights of a creditor are fixed by the condition of affairs as
they existed at the time of the inception of his lien."
"-Central National Bank and Trust Co. v. Kuntz, Supra., note 2.
(161 At.) at page, 603; "The law was made broad enough to cover
every 'bona fide judgment creditor' without imposing a further burden
upon him or restricting him to either indebtedness since the creation of
the trust or to an indebtedness incurred on the faith and credit of the
land so held in trust."
17Central National Bank and Trust Co. v. Kuntz, Supra., notes 2
pnd 16.
'sRosa v. Hummel, 252 Pa. 261, (1921), "However beneficial it
;night be to extend the scope of the law, such relief should come from
the legislature rather than from a forced construction of the statute by
the courts".
IgSupra., notes 2 and 3.
20A, B. Dick and Co. v. The Third National Bank, 17 D. G C. 549,
(1932).
MlSupra., notes 11 and 12.
'2 Beman Thomas Co. v. White, 269 Pa. 261, (1921),
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C entered a judgment against A in whose name the property
stood. B had been entitled to the beneficial interest in the
property under a purchase money trust. Had the judgment
been entered when things so stood it would have prevailed,
but A had conveyed to B just before it was entered, and al-
though the conveyance was not recorded, C failed because
B now held under a claim which was not void as against
judgment creditors. Such a conveyance would not have
been good against a purchaser or mortgagee and is no long-
er good against a subsequent creditor.
Thus, so far as judgment creditors, as differentiated
from purchasers and mortgagees, are concerned, the curing
of the defect in the recording acts gives them better pro-
tection than does the Act of 1901. Now their protection
against purchase money trusts is merely one incident of
their broader protection tinder the recording acts. It is to
be doubted whether in the future the Act of 1901 will be
used as a device to afford such relief to creditors.
Considering all three classes; creditors, purchasers, and
mortgagees, there are situations where they have equally
sought relief under this act. To the extent to which they
have done so in the past, it is still necessary for them so to
do. Such actions have had the effect of avoiding either the
doctrine of notice from possession, or the doctrine of lis
pendens. In so far as those purposes have been effected,
the Act of 1901 may be said to supplement the recording
acts, and to 'a certain extent defeat their purposes.
A purchaser of land takes free from prior inconsistent
interests of which he has no notice. This notice may be
actual or constructive. Actual notice means direct and
positive knowledge of the prior interest 23 If there exists a
state of facts from which the purchaser should know of the
interest he will be deemed to have notice thereof. Thus, if
A purports to sell land of which he has the record title, but
possession of which is in B, the purchaser is bound to in-
quire of B to ascertain on what rights his possession rests,
21Fallon, "Pennsylvania Law of Conveyancing," (1902), page 296.
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and will be charged with notice of what such inquiry would
have disclosed.2" Without attempting to discuss the limi-
tations of this doctrine of possession as notice,2 other than
to observe that the possession must be, "exclusive, open,
and notorious" 2 and must be inconsistent with the record
title,27 it may be stated that possession sufficient to put a
purchaser on notice of the claims of the possessor, does
not constitute notice where the possessor is claiming under
a purchase money trust.28 In the first case involving the
Act of 1901 it was stated; 29 "It seems quite clear that the
notice contemplated by the act is actual notice. The legis-
lature must have had a purpose in including mortgagees and
purchasers in the protection against resulting trusts, but if
they are still to be affected by mere constructive notice,
such as was given by the occupation of the land . . . they
are in exactly the same position as they were before the
act."
The doctrine of notice from possession is at best a
harsh one. 0  In view of the fact that there is almost in-
variably some intimate or familiar relationship between the
parties to a resulting trust, which would naturally tend to
mislead a third party, the operation of the statute in this
respect seems to be unobjectionable.
Somewhat akin to the problem of notice is the problem
as to who is affected by the doctrine of "lis pendens"311 It
24Jamison v. Dimrock, 95 Pa. 52, (1880); Smith v. Miller (No. 1),
289 Pa. 184, 186, (1927), and cases there cited; Robey, "Real Estate
and Conveyancing in Pennsylvania", (1923), page 166.
2.See exhaustive digest and discussion in 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49,
(1909).
26Meehan v. Williams, 48 Pa. 238, 240, (1864).
27Woods v. Farmere, 7 Watts 382, (1838); Lance v. Gorman,
Supra., note 12; Smith v. Miller (No. 2), 296 Pa. 340, 345, (1929).
28Supra., note 4.
29Rochester Trust Co. v. White, Supra., note 4 (243 Pa.) at page
474.
3OLyman, "The Doctrine of Constructive Notice as Applied to Real
Estate Conveyances" in 19 Dickinson Law Review 147, 156 (1915).
3 s"The doctrine is one branch of the law of constructive notice",
Phelps v. Elliott, 35 Fed. 455, 460, (1888).
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is well settled in this state that if A conveys property con-
cerning which there is litigation pending to which A is a
party, the purchaser takes subject to the outcome of the
suit.12  This doctrine is not based on the protection of in-
nocent parties, but upon the consideration that no suit could
be successfully terminated, if, during its pendency, the
property of a party could be transferred so that it would not
be bound by the decree or judgment in the hands of the
transferee. 33 It has been stated that this applies to all actions
directly affecting real estate, including actions to subject
land to a trust.34  The leading case in this country on the
application of this doctrine was one to protect a cestui
against alienation of the trust corpus by the trustee pend-
ing a trust adjudication." In a somewhat similar case it
was stated:32 "If the relief sought in a suit is for the re-
covery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an
SzGreen v. Rick, 121 Pa. 130, (1888); Dovey's Appeal, 97 Pa. 153,
(1881).
. 3sDovey's Appeal, Supra.. note 32; Thompson, "Titles to Real
Property" Sec. 545 (1919); In Tilton v. Cofield, 93 U. S. 163, 168,
(1876), it was stated: "The law is that he who intermeddles with prop-
erty in litigation does so at his peril, and is conclusively bound by the
results of the litigation whatever they may be, as if he had been a party
to it from the outset".
2'Thompson, opp. cit. supra., note 33, In Baird v. Corwin, 17 Pa.
462, (1851), a person bought a property during a partition proceeding ,
and it was held that the lis pendens was of itself sufficient to give him
notice. In Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. C. R. (N. Y., 1817) a cestui
was protected by lis pendens when his trustee fraudulently disposed of
his property pending a suit to remove him.
35In Murray & Winter v. Ballou & Hunt, I Johns. C. R., 566, 580,
(N. Y., 1815), Chancellor Kent, after tracing the history of the doc-
trine, states: "It would be impossible, as I apprehend, to mention any
rult of law which has been established on higher authority or with
more uniform sanction." The doctrine as applied in this case was ap-
proved in Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 37 Pa. 353, 356 (1860).
s6Wingfield v. Neall, 60 W. Va. 106, 54 S. E. 47, 10 L. R. A.
(N. S) 433, 448, (1906). "Applications of the doctrine accordingly
occur in connection with actions of ejectment, as well as in connection
with equitable proceedings, such as suits to foreclose a mortgage, or to
establish a trust in land, or to set aside a conveyance, or for partition".
2 Tiffany, "Real Property" Sec. 579 (1920).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
adjudication between conflicting claims of title, or any
other judicial action affecting the title, possession, or right
to possession of specific property, then the property is so
directly affected by the decree sought that it becomes sub-
ject to the law of 'is pendens'."
In view of such considerations what does the Act of
1901 mean when it states that a resulting trust shall be
void unless it is recorded, "or (2) an action of ejectment
has been begun in the proper county by the person advanc-
ing the purchase money against the holder of the legal
title"? Very often the person who has paid the purchase
money is in possession. He cannot record a declaration of
trust for that must be executed by the trustee.3 7 He cannot
bring ejectment since he is in possessionA He can enforce
the trust by a bill in equity to establish the trust", or by
proceeding under the Acts of 188940 or 189341 to force the
holder of the legal title to bring ejectment or to have an
issue framed to try the dispute of title. Do none of these
actions protect the beneficiary if the trustee chooses to con-
vey pending them? The act indicates that they would not.
The appellate courts of the state have not been called upon
37Supra., note 1.
38"A party cannot maintain ejectment for land in his own posses-
sion," Krebbs v. Downing, 25 Pa. 399 (1855).
39Hutchinson v. Dennis, 217 Pa. 290, (1907).
40"An Act for Settling of Titles to Real Estate", the Act of March
8. 1889, P. L. 10, Sec. 1, as amended by the Act of April 16, 1903. P.
L. 212, providing that a person in possession of land can petition for a
rule to show cause why a person not in possession but having a claim
thereto should not bring ejectment.
41"An Act for Quieting the Title to Land", Act of June 10, 1893,
P. L. 415, providing that any person in possession claiming under any
right, which right, or title, or right to possession is disputed, can obtain
a rule to show cause why an issue should not be granted to determine
the dispute.
It has been stated that a beneficiary cannot pursue a trustee through
the medium of either of these acts, prior to having his trust declared,
Joyce's Petition, 26 Dist. 1122 (1917), but it seems that the decision in
that case depended more on the nature of the possession of the plain-
tiff. In view of Hutchinson v. Dennis, Supra., note 39, and Smith v.
Hibbs, 213 Pa. 202 (1906) such a contention cannot be maintained.
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to pass on the question, and but a single instance involving it
has been reported from a court of first instance. In that
case, Knecht v. Reichard,42 A paid for property, title to
which was placed in his wife. She deserted him, leaving
him in possession. She brought an action of ejectment,
and he brought an action under the Act of 1893,
which latter action was called by the court,'3  "an
action in the nature of ejectment." While both these actions
were pending a judgment was entered against the wife. The
court held without discussion or authority that the creditor
was protected by the Act of 1901, stating merely that "the
action of ejectment was the reverse of that referred to in the
Act.' ' 4 If this is a correct statement, the Act of 1901 abro-
gates the doctrine of "lis pendens", unless one single type of
action is pending.
It is submitted that such should not be the law. The
rule of Knecht v. Reichard, can be avoided by a more liberal
construction of the provision requiring an action of eject-
ment. If the beneficiary proceeds under either the Act of
1889 or the Act of 1893, certainly the provision should be
satisfied. The provision must have been placed there to fur-
nish beneficiaries some mode of protecting themselves from
acts of the trustees without perpetrating a fraud upon third
parties. There is no reason why a beneficiary's power to
protect his interest should depend on his being out of pos-
session of the land, and especially is this so in view of the
fact that his possession does not constitute notice to third
parties.4 5 Actions brought by persons in possession and
those brought by persons out of possession both accomplish
the same end; namely, adjudicating disputes as to title and
right to possession.46 Both are properly placed on the
ejectment index, thus giving third parties equal notice.' 7
42Supra., note 5.
43 Supra.. note 5. (22 Dist.) at page 915.
44Supra., note 43.
45Supra.. notes 28 and 29.
4GEarhart v. Marshall, 233 Pa. 365, (1912); Ullom v. Hughes, 204
Pa. 305, (1902).
47SMith v. Hibbs, Supra., note 41.
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Both contain all the elements of a valid "is'". 4 The same
force and effect is given to the verdict in both cases.
4 9
Since, therefore, they are affirmative actions brought by the
beneficiary to protect his interest, and they both give notice
to third parties, it is difficult to see why they cannot be con-
sidered as actions of ejectment. If they are not so consid-
ered, then the beneficiary cannot protect himself unless he
can manage to get actual notice to a purchaser, and this is
virtually impossible.50 The courts will be powerless to aid
the beneficiary, for pending any proceeding the trustee can
alienate the property. It is to cure this very evil that the
doctrine of lis pendens has been adhered to as a necessary
power of the courts. 1 It is not reasonable that the legisla-
ture should have intended such a result, and it is doubtful
whether the appellate courts on a thorough consideration of
48"A purchaser is affected by a lis pendens only if the land in litiga-
tion is described in the pleadings with such reasonable certainty as to
enable him to know that it is the land which he proposes to purchase",
2 Tiffany, "Real Property", Sec. 579, (1920). For the essentials of a
valid lis pendens see De Pass v. Chitty, 90 Fla. 77, 105 So. 148, 150,
(1925), and Rardin v. Rardin, 85 W. Va., 145; 102 S. E. 295; 10 A.L.R.
300 (1919).
49Act of 1893, Supra., note 41, provides, "and the verdict of the
jury in such issue shall have the same force and effect upon the right
and title and right of possession of the respective parties . . . as a
verdict in ejectment upon an equitable title."
50"To bring home to every purchaser the charge of actual notice of
the suit must, from the very nature of the cause, be in a great degree
impracticable", Parks v. Jackson, 11 Wend., 442, 449, (N. Y., 1833).
51"If this rule were not attended to there would be no end to any
suit; the justice of the courts would be evaded and great hardship and
inconvenience to the suitor necessarily introduced. It is extremely diffi-
cult to draw any line, and very dangerous to allow of the rule being
frittered away by exceptions", Chancellor Kent, in Murray v. Lylburn,
Supra., note 34. "Lis pendens is usually understood as the control which
a court has over the property involved in a suit", Bungar v. St. Mich-
aels Church, 272 Pa. 402, 404, (1922). "The effect of a lis pendens is
founded upon the necessity of such a rule to give effect to the proceed-
ings of courts of justice", Central Trust Co. v. Harless, W. Va., 152 S.
E. 209, 211, (1930).
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the question would so narrowly construe the act. "2
Notwithstanding the evils of such a construction, it has
been reached. In view of that construction and the rule
that possession does not amount to notice, the conclusion is
that a creditor, mortgagee, or purchaser of or from a pur-
chase money trustee receives a greater degree of protec-
tion than do persons taking similar interests from any other
record title holders.
J. Boyd Landis
1 2"There is no rule that, without relation to the other parts of the
act, or the whole system of the laws; without relation to the unjust
consequences, that would flow from literal adherence, without relation to
the clear scope and design, (that) courts must adhere to the very words
and letter of the law; for the letter of a statute will be enlarged or dim-
inished according to legal discretion, so as to embrace all the purposes
designed by it", per Duncan, J., in Stewart v. Keemle, 4 S. 6 R. 72, 73,
(1818).
